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CASE COMMENT
GANDARA V. BENNE71 DOES THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S
DECISION PRESAGE THE FUTURE OF ARTICLE 36 IN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE?
Stephen D. Lott*

I. SUMMARY
Petitioner, a national of Uruguay, brought suit against respondents
in a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner, seeking money
damages, alleged that his rights under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, article 36, had been violated when authorities failed
to notify him of his right to have the Uruguayan consulate notified of
his arrest and detention. The District Court dismissed his complaint. On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal because it found that
article 36 created no judicially enforceable individual rights. This
decision represents an important evolution because, prior to the instant
case, the Eleventh Circuit had not considered the meaning and effect of
article 36 in a civil context. The court joins the Ninth Circuit in reaching
this conclusion. If the court's decision is adopted by future panels it
could lead to an overall reduction in the amount of § 1983 litigation,
which might serve to reduce government expenditures on litigation and
damage payments. It also might jeopardize Americans abroad if foreign
courts decide to mirror the Eleventh Circuit and find that foreign
nationals have no enforceable rights under article 36.
DESCRIPTORS: International law, Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Article 36, Individual Rights, Foreign Nationals, 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
H. FACTS
Hector Gandara, a national of Uruguay, was arrested on September
11, 2004 in Gln County, Georgia and charged with one count of false
imprisonment. After pleading guilty, he was sentenced to five years in
* B.A., May 2008, University of Florida; J.D., May 2011, University of Florida Levin
College of Law. This piece is dedicated to my parents, David & Diane Lott. Thank you for
always believing in me.
1. Gandara v. Bennet, 528 F.3d 823, 825 (1Ith Cir. 2008).
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prison and five years probation. 2 Gandara subsequently filed a
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
against the Glynn County Sherriff's Office, detention center officers, a
sheriff, and a county district attorney.3 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983,
Gandara argued that respondents violated his rights under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations ("treaty") by failing to inform him of
his right to have the Uruguayan Consulate notified of his arrest and
detention.4 He sought a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages,
and punitive damages.5 The District Court dismissed Gandara's
complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim. 6 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court but for
different reasons.7 It HELD that it was proper to dismiss Gandara's §
1983 claim because article 36 of the treaty does not create judicially
enforceable individual rights.
III. HISTORY
In 1963, various nations sent delegates to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations.9 The result of the conference was a treaty which
codified international consular practices and procedures. The U.S.
Senate ratified the treaty in 1969.10 In the years since, one section,
article 36, has created some confusion within the legal community.II
Section 1(b) of the article states that: "if he so requests, the
competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform
the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of the State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody
or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without delay.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 826.
8. Id. at 826-29.
9. As of January 2000, 167 countries were signatories to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. "Foreign National: International Instruments: The Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations," The International Justice Project, http://www.internationaljusticeproject.
org/nationalsInstruments.cfim.
10. ExEc. REP. No. 91-9: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninety-First
Congress, first session, as reprinted in Library of Congress archives.
11. Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2007).
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The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of
his rights under this subparagraph."' 2
Thus, because of its wording, article 36 has given rise to a debate as
to whether it creates enforceable individual rights for foreign nationals.
The confusion has been exacerbated by further questions of how the
treaty's preamble factors into the equation. The preamble states that
"the purpose of [the privileges endowed by the treaty] is not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by
consular posts."' 3
The U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in several times as to the
significance of article 36 in American jurisprudence. However, it has
yet to issue a definitive ruling as to whether article 36 creates individual
rights.
In Breardv. Greene, the Court considered the claim of a Paraguayan
national who had been sentenced to death in Virginia for capital
murder.14 On appeal, petitioner claimed that his rights under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations had been violated via the failure of
Virginia authorities to notify him of his right to have the Paraguayan
consulate contacted and informed of his arrest. 5 As a consequence,
petitioner argued, his convictions had to be vacated. 16
After considering the issue, the Supreme Court "nearly recognized
that . . . the individual petitioner had actionable rights under the

Convention that were violated." 7 The Court, however, stopped short of
recognizing the existence of individual rights. Instead, it held that
because petitioner had failed to raise the treaty violation claim in state
court, he was procedurally barred from asserting it on appeal.' 8
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Court considered the claims of
two foreign nationals who sought the vacation of their criminal
convictions based upon violations of the Vienna Convention.' 9 The
Court's over-arching holding was that a violation of article 36 does not
necessarily require reversal of a criminal conviction or sentence. 20 The
Court also issued more particular holdings for each of the petitioners.
Regarding Bustillo, a national of Honduras, the Court affirmed its
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36 1(b), pr. 24, 1963.
Id. pmbl.
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372 (1998).
Id. at 373.
Id.

17.

JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 394-95

(2000).
18. Breard,523 U.S. at 375.
19. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
20. Id. at 360.
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holding in Breard that "claims under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention may be subjected to the same procedural default rules that
apply generally to other federal-law claims." 2 1 In re Sanchez-Llamas, a
national of Mexico, the Court held that suppression of his statement to
the police would not be an appropriate remedy for treaty violation.22
Several circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeal have issued more
precise rulings as to the meaning and effect of article 36. However,
there has been substantial variance of opinion among these courts.
Prior to the instant case, the Eleventh Circuit had only considered
whether the treaty conferred individual rights in a criminal context. In
Maharajv. Sec'yfor the Dep't of Corr., the circuit court considered the
appeal of Krishna Maharaj, a British national convicted of murder in
Florida.23 Maharaj argued that he was entitled to post-conviction relief
because the British Consulate was never notified of his arrest. The
circuit court, however, disagreed and found that the treaty does not
create enforceable individual rights. 24 In support, the circuit court
explained that the Vienna Convention was an "'agreement between
countries, not citizens,"' and that the language of the preamble made
clear that the delegates did not intend to create individual rights. 2 5
In Jogi v. Voges, the Seventh Circuit considered whether Jogi, an
Indian national who had been convicted of aggravated battery with a
firearm in Illinois, could pursue a § 198326 claim against law
enforcement officials who allegedly failed to inform Jogi that he was
entitled to have the Indian consulate notified of his arrest. 27
Consequently, the main focus of the circuit court's inquiry was whether
2 1. Id.
22. Id. at 337.
23. Maharaj v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292 (1lth Cir. 2006).
24. Id. at 1307.
25. Id. (quoting Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Fla. 2003)). The Eleventh
Circuit again considered the meaning of article 36 in United States v. Rodriguez, in which it
found that "the Vienna Convention does not confer judicially enforceable individual rights."
United States v. Rodriguez, 162 Fed. Appx. 853, 857 (1lth Cir. 2006). The Fifth and Sixth
Circuits have issued opinions which hold that the Vienna Convention does not confer individual
rights in the context of a criminal proceeding, and that violation of the treaty does not
necessarily require reversal of a criminal conviction or sentence. United States v. Jimenez-Nava,
243 F.3d 192, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 391-94 (6th
Cir. 2001).
26. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2009) (stating that "[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subject, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.").
27. Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2007).
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article 36 creates individual rights that are privately enforceable under §
1983. In this respect, Jogi differed from previous cases involving article
36 because it dealt with whether the treaty created rights that could be
enforced in a civil, rather than a criminal, context.2 8
The Seventh Circuit ultimately decided that Jogi could pursue his §
1983 claim because, as it found, article 36 creates judicially enforceable
individual rights which signatory states are obligated to respect. 29 I
reaching this conclusion the panel relied upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Gonzaga v. Doe, which found that "if Congress wishes to
create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and
unambiguous terms." 30
Employing the Court's reasoning in Gonzaga, the Seventh Circuit
found that for an individual right to exist, it "must appear
unambiguously in either the statute or, as applied here, the treaty."31
The court then decided that the text of the treaty satisfied this
requirement; that article 36 clearly intended to establish enforceable
individual rights. 32
Regarding the treaty's preamble, which disclaims any intention to
benefit individuals, the Jogi court explained that it should be understood
as saying that the Convention was "not designed to benefit diplomats in
their individual capacity, but rather to protect them in their official
capacity."33 Thus, because § 1983 protects "'against all forms of official
violation of federally protected rights,"' and Jogi had rights under the
treaty, 34 the circuit court held that Jogi could go forward with his

claim.3 5
28. The circuit court, emphasizing this difference, noted that Jogi was not challenging his
criminal conviction. Rather, he was suing the defendants for their supposed violation of his
rights under the treaty.
29. Jogi, 480 F.3d at 836.
30. Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002).
31. Jogi, 480 F.3d at 828.
32. Id. at 835-36.
33. Id. at 833.
34. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution establishes that rights created via
treaty enjoy status as the supreme law of the land. In pertinent part, the clause states that the
"Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." U.S. CONST.
art. VI.
35. Both the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
have issued rulings that echo the Seventh Circuit's decision in Jogi. In 1999, the latter court
issued an advisory opinion which declared that article 36 creates individual rights and is an
exception to the rest of the treaty (Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Due ProcessofLaw is a FundamentalRight [OC-16/99), 182]). The ICJ, in Avena and
other Mexican Nationals (aka Mexico v. United States of America), found that individual and
State rights are interdependent; that "violations of the rights of the individual under article 36
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In Cornejo v. County of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit came to
the opposite conclusion, finding that Cornejo, a national of Mexico who
was arrested and detained in California, could not pursue a § 1983 claim
because article 36 does not create individual rights. 36 In so deciding, the
Cornejo court found that the requirement of Gonzaga was not satisfied;
that article 36 "does not unambiguously give Cornejo a privately
enforceable right to be notified."37 The Cornejo court explained that the
"focus of Article 36 is on consular functions," and therefore "[tihe
privileges discussed are explicitly those relating to the consularpost."3 8
IV. INSTANT CASE

In Gandarav. Bennet, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit
in holding that, because article 36 does not create judicially enforceable
individual rights, a foreign national cannot maintain a civil action under
§ 1983 for violation of such rights.3 9 In reaching this conclusion, the
Gandara court acknowledged the complexity of the legal question
involved and gave consideration to the other circuits' findings
concerning the meaning and effect of article 36.40
First, the Gandaracourt agreed with the Ninth Circuit's finding in
Cornejo that "'a treaty must be interpreted as a whole ... including the
preamble."'41 Because the preamble declares that the purpose of the
treaty is not to benefit individuals, the Gandaracourt found, as it had in
previous cases, that the treaty "disclaims any intent to create individual

rights." 42
Second, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit's finding
that "'[a]rticle 36 confers legal rights and obligations on States,"' and
not individuals, "'in order to facilitate and promote consular

may entail a violation of the rights of the sending State, and that violations of the rights of the
latter may entail a violation of the rights of the individual." I.C.J Reports 2004, at 36. In
response, the Supreme Court has said that the ICJ's interpretation deserves "respectful
consideration," but it is not binding for American courts. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.
331, 353 (2006).
36. Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2007).
37. Id. at 863.
38. Id. at 860. The circuit court further explained that "the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations is an agreement among States whose subject matter - 'Consular Relations' is quintessentially State-to-State."
39. Gandara v. Bennet, 528 F.3d at 826-29 (11th Cir. 2008).
40. Id. at 825 (finding that "the issue is a close one with strong arguments on both
sides.").
41. Id. at 827 (quoting Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 861 n.13).
42. United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1281-82 (1Ith Cir. 2002).
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functions.'"43 The Gandaracourt then stated that, as a matter of general
judicial policy, courts should not infer the creation of enforceable
individual rights from international treaties.44
Third, the Gandara court pointed to the fact that the text of the
treaty makes no mention of how violations of article 36 should be
compensated.4 5 It explained that this failure to "provide for private
damages actions" is further evidence that the delegates did not intend
for individual rights to be created. The Gandara court also noted that
the U.S. State Department and travaux preparatoiresshare the court's

position. 46
Lastly, the Gandaracourt found that it was bound by the prior panel
rule, which obligates it to adhere to the rulings of "'earlier panels unless
and until they are clearly overruled en banc or by the Supreme
Court."'47 Thus, even though prior panels' analyses of the treaty
occurred in criminal contexts, the court nonetheless felt that the
established rule, that "the Vienna Convention does not confer
enforceable individual rights," was applicable to claims under § 1983.48

V. ANALYSIS
Given the Eleventh Circuit's prior rulings in re the Vienna
Convention, its holding in the instant case should not come as much of a
surprise. It does not seem much of a jump from finding that "the Vienna
Convention does not confer judicially enforceable individual rights" in a
criminal context, to finding that the treaty does not confer individual
rights that can be enforced in a civil action via a § 1983 claim.
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit's expansion of the law from its prior
decisions represents a subtle but important evolution.
Since 1961 49 "the volume of § 1983 litigation in the federal courts
has increased more than one hundredfold," the result of which has been
43. Gandara,528 F.3d at 828 (quoting Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 855).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 828-29 n.3 (quoting United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (finding
that "the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their
negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.")).
47. Id. at 829 (quoting Swann v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir.
2004)).
48. Id.
49. In 1961, the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape, in which it found that if a
government official, acting under color of state law, violates an individual's rights, then liability
attaches and a civil claim for damages can be made pursuant to § 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961).
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substantial costs to government and, consequently, to taxpayers.o With
the current national debt exceeding 11 trillion dollars, the court's ruling
in Gandara will likely be viewed favorably from an economic
standpoint. 5 ' Fewer lawsuits against the government mean less public
dollars being spent on litigation costs and damage awards.
Conversely, as other commentators have noted, if more courts
eventually side with the Seventh Circuit, which found in Jogi that
article 36 does bestow individual rights, a likely result would be an even
greater amount of § 1983 litigation, which will mean a heavier
monetary burden for taxpayers. 52
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit's decision could have deleterious
effects for Americans travelling and living abroad. If foreign courts see
more and more American courts refusing to recognize individual rights
under the treaty, they might reciprocate by issuing similar rulings,
thereby denying Americans rights under the treaty which they might
have otherwise enjoyed.
From a purely legal standpoint, the decision seems in several ways,
more persuasive than the Seventh Circuit's decision in Jogi. For
example, the Gandara court makes the point that no private damage
remedies are mentioned in the text of article 36. If the delegates to the
convention did intend to create individual rights, one would think they
might include in the text, at the very least, some suggestion that
violations of article 36 ought to be compensated. To leave it to national
courts to subsequently infer the existence of an implied damage remedy
seems somewhat odd.
Secondly, the decision to consider the treaty's preamble in
discerning the meaning of article 36 seems prudent. If article 36 was
intended to create individual rights, why would the drafters of the treaty
include language in the preamble that seems to deny any intention to
create such rights? Thus, public policy ramifications aside, the Eleventh
Circuit's legal conclusions seem well-founded.

50. MARY MASSARON Ross, SWORD & SHIELD REVISITED: A PRACTIcAL APPROACH TO
SECTION 1983, at 142 (2006).
51. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Public Debt, "The Debt to the Penny and
Who Holds It," http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited Jan.
31, 2010).
52. Anthony Jones, Comment, Jogi v. Voges: Has the Seventh Circuit Opened the
Floodgates to Vienna Convention Litigation in U.S. Courts?, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 425 (2006).
For further discussion, see also Goubarkov Dmitri, Federal Courts: Finding a Remedy When
None Seems Available, Jogi v. Voges, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 235 (2008).
53. Gandara,528 F.3d at 828.
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VI. CONCLUSION

It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will adopt the
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning when and if it makes a decision as to
whether article 36 creates individual rights. Whatever the Court decides
could have both positive and negative impacts for Americans. If the
positions of the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits are embraced, then the U.S.
government will save money because it will not have to pay damages to
§ 1983 claimants for State violations of the Vienna Convention.
However, Americans abroad could suffer as a result of the possible
reciprocity of foreign courts deciding to mirror the Supreme Court.
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